Deconstructing Innocence: Reflections from a Public Defender: Can student attorneys accept the paradigm of guilt and continue zealous representation? by Brown, Geneva
33
Deconstructing
Innocence: Reflections
from a Public Defender:
Can student attorneys
accept the paradigm of
guilt and continue
zealous representation?
Geneva Brown
Assistant Professor of Law
Valparaiso University School of Law, Indiana, USA
Introduction
I am a true believer.1 I was a public defender for nine years and represented thousands of  guilty
defendants without guilt or emotional angst. The public defender credo is to give zealous
representation without consideration for the innocence or guilt of  the client.2 As a clinical
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1 See Minna Kotkin, Creating True Believers: Putting
Macro Theory Into Practice, 5 J. Clinical L Rev. 95
(1998). Kotkin argues that Clinical teachers should
employ macro theory in their teaching
methodology to introduce the idea of  “critical
lawyering as an over-arching paradigm that will
imbue students with skills and a solid theoretical
foundation.” See also Damon Centola, Robb Willer
and Michael Macy, The Emperor’s Dilemma: A
Computational Model of  Self-Enforcing Norms, 110
Am. J. Soc. 4 (2005). The authors describe the true
believer as one who believes in the enforcement of
a social norm, (in my case, the quality of
representation has not defined the guilt or
innocence of  the client) and the enforcement of  the
norm is done for the right reason. They note it is
better not to comply with the norm than create the
illusion of  sincerity. As the authors note, “true
believers reserve special contempt for imposters.”
Id.
2 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications:
Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106
Harv. L. Rev. 1239 (1993); Abbe Smith & William
Montross, The Calling of  Criminal Defense, 50
Mercer L. Rev. 443 (1999).
instructor I must impart ethical and diligent representation to my students.3 I found, however,
when discussing cases during our weekly case rounds the paradigm of  innocence would inevitably
become a question for the student attorney. The students imputed guilt and innocence to be
mutually exclusive. 
Imparting the ethical component of  criminal defense – to be competent in having legal knowledge,
skill and thoroughness of  preparation – to the students was a job I was thoroughly prepared to
teach. I found, however, that beyond ethical considerations of  representing clients, I needed to
deconstruct innocence.4 I wanted to present to students a paradigm that guilt or innocence is
secondary to servicing the needs of  the client and protecting the client’s rights through the maze
of  a convoluted and dispassionate court system.5 Creating a dialogue that evolved from loaded
terms such as guilt, truth or innocence and creating representation where the focal point became
servicing the needs of  the client became my goal. 
This article examines the impact and the importance of  the innocence movement and the
unintended effects on criminal defense representation. Part I examines the impact of  innocence in
my juvenile clinic. Part II proceeds to examine the paradigm of  the innocence movement and its
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3 See, e.g., Steven Hartwell, Moral Development,
Ethical Conduct and Clinical Education, 35 N.Y.L.
Sch. L. Rev. 131 (1990); Robert D. Dinerstein,
Clinical Scholarship and the Justice Mission, 40 Clev.
St. L. Rev. 469 (1992); Fren Quigley, Seizing the
Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory and the
Teaching of  Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2
Clinical L. Rev. 37 (1995); Minna J. Kotkin, The Law
School Clinic: A Training Ground for Public Interest
Lawyers in Educating for Justice: Social Values and
Legal Education 129 (Jeremy Cooper & Louise G.
Trubek eds., 1997). 
4 The concern for the innocent being falsely
convicted in the American criminal justice system is
a well documented issue. My concern is that the
state of  being innocent overshadows client-centered
representation. See, e.g., Brandon Garrett, Judging
Innocence, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 55 (2008) (reviewing
the empirical study conducted to determine how
people who were ultimately exonerated were
handled by the American criminal justice system);
Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of  Defense Counsel
and the Rise of  Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93
Cal. L. Rev. 1585, 1590-91, 1644 (2005) (describing
impact of  wrongful convictions on criminal trials
and investigations); Brandon Garrett, Aggregation in
Criminal Law, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 449-50 (2007)
(exploring systemic reform efforts in courts and
innocence commissions aiming to remedy wrongful
convictions); Brandon Garrett, Innocence Harmless
Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005
Wis. L. Rev. 35, 82-85, 99-110 (describing possible
transformative effect of  wrongful conviction cases
on underlying criminal procedure rules); Daniel S.
Medwed, Innocence Lost... and Found:  An
Introduction to The Faces of  Wrongful Conviction
Symposium Issue, 37 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 1, 1
(2006) (introducing symposium); Richard A. Rosen,
Reflections on Innocence, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 237
(introducing symposium and discussing Criminal
Justice in the Age of  Innocence). 
5 See generally, Mary Jo Eyster, Analysis of  Sexism in
Legal Practice:  A Clinical Approach, 38 J. Legal
Educ. 183 (1988) (discussing the problems of  sexism
and strategies used to address the problems);
Shelley Gavigan, Twenty-Five Years of  Dynamic
Tension: The Parkdale Community Legal Services
Experience, 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 443, 467 (1997)
(discussing anti-racism skills); Bill Ong Hing,
Raising Personal Identification Issues of  Class, Race,
Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical
Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 Stan. L.
Rev. 1807 (1993); Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the
Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client Centered
Counseling, 27 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 345, 348
(1997) (exploring how race neutral-training of
interviewing and counseling skills may lead to
continued marginalization of  clients of  color);
Michelle S. Jacobs, Full Legal Representation for the
Poor: The Clash Between Lawyer Values and Client
Worthiness, 44 How. L.J. 257 (2001) (explaining how
law students engage in value ranking); Michelle S.
Jacobs, Clinical Essay: Legitimacy and the Power
Game, 1 Clinical L. Rev. 187 (1994) (confronting the
belief  of  many clinical instructors that supervisory
relationships should be characterized by co-
operative, equal, non-hierarchical organization);
Rose Voyvodic & Mary Medcalf, Advancing Social
Justice Through an Interdisciplinary Approach to
Clinical Legal Education: The Case of  Legal
Assistance of  Windsor, 14 Wasg. U. J.L. & Pol’y 101
(2004).
impact on the criminal justice system. Part III examines the rise of  Innocence Projects and the
effect on clinical legal education. Part IV deconstructs the importance of  innocence and the
substantive and procedural problems with innocence. Part V concludes the article with an
assertion of  the importance of  zealous representation regardless of  innocence or guilt. 
I. A Question of Innocence
In my juvenile justice clinic, we began to represent two juvenile females who were both charged
with prostitution.6 Both girls, Jill and Dana, denied the charges at the initial hearing.7 I paired a
student attorney and a student social worker to represent both girls. I immediately noticed an
affinity the student attorney and the social worker had for Jill. Jill vehemently denied the charges.
Jill spoke softly with a slight southern drawl and was the model of  courtesy. Dana was more of  an
enigma. She was not forthcoming. Dana was not so emphatic in her denials but she refused to enter
an admission to a prostitution charge. During case rounds we discussed the similarities and
differences of  Jill’s and Dana’s cases. 
Assumptions were immediately being made about Jill. The students created a narrative of  a run-
away whose mother abandoned her and who was being exploited by a dangerous boyfriend and
possible pimp.8 The police detained Jill for being a minor in a casino in the company of  a man they
presumed was her pimp. Dana did not have a narrative. The students reviewed the police reports.
Undercover vice detectives brought Dana and her teenaged companion to a hotel room and
arrested both of  them after drinks and conversation. Dana’s exploitation was ambiguous as was
her innocence.
The moral ambiguity in Dana’s case was compounded by her refusal to accept plea bargains. The
magistrate would only accept an admission to the charge or a trial.9 We were going to have to try
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6 The treatment of  teenaged prostitutes by the adult
criminal or juvenile delinquency system motivated
the students to keep our clients from being a party
in the system any longer than necessary. For further
discussion see Geneva O. Brown, Little Girl Lost:
Las Vegas Metro Police Vice Division and the Use of
Material Witness Holds Against Teenaged Prostitutes,
57 Cath. U. L. Rev. 471 (2008).  
7 The names are changed to protect the confidential
status of  juvenile clients. 
8 I would be remiss to dismiss the importance of
narrative in representing clients but the students’
narrative emphasized innocence. See e.g., Sarah
Buel, Effective Assistance of  Counsel for Battered
Women Defendants: A Normative Construct, 26 Harv.
Women’s L.J. 217 (2003) (describing how lawyers
must address race and class issues of  battered
woman for effective representation); Leigh
Goodmark, Telling Stories, Saving Lives: Battered
Mothers’ Testimony Project, Womens’ Narratives and
Court Reform, 37 Ariz. St. L.J. (2005) (describing the
methodology, finding and conclusions of  the
Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project); V. Puslani
Enos, Lois Kanter, Who’s Listening: Introducing
Students to Client-Centered, Client-Empowering and
Multidisciplinary Problem Solving In a Clinical
Setting, 9 Clinical L. Rev. 83 (2002) (describing the
use of  listening abilities of  students involved in the
Boston Medical Center Domestic Violence Project);
John B. Mitchell, Narrative and Client Centered
Representation: What is a True Believer to do When His
Two Favorite Theories Collide, 6 Clinical L. Rev. 85
(1999); John B. Mitchell, Why Should Prosecutors Get
the Last Word, 27 Amer. J. Crim. L. 139 (2000)
(examines why a system that is constructed to favor
the defendant gives the last word to the state);
Patricia Puritz & Katayoon Majd, Ensuring
Authentic Youth Participation in Delinquency Cases:
Creating a Specialized Paradigm for Juvenile Defense
Practice, 45 Fam. Ct. Rev 466 (2007) (describing how
juvenile defense attorneys must challenge racial,
class and gender injustices in the juvenile system).
9 The constitutional rights of  juvenile defendants are
a continuing cause for concern. For more on
juvenile rights see Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of
Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile
Courts, 54 Fla. L. Rev. 577 (2002); Cecilia Espenoza,
Good Kids, Bad Kids: A Revelation About the Due
Process Rights of  Kids, 23 Hatings Const. L.Q. 402
(1996).
a case with a less than innocent client. The district attorney could not prove Jill was a prostitute
and the court dismissed the petition. Was Jill any more innocent than Dana was guilty? The
students became frustrated with representation because they did not know if  Dana was a child
lured and entrapped by vice detectives or if  she was a provocative child-woman who went to a hotel
room with strange men prepared to have sex in exchange for money.10
Reflecting on case rounds involving Jill and Dana’s cases, I garnered that they wanted to know if
either was innocent. We would discuss the weight of  the evidence which was greater against Dana
than Jill.  In general, the students attempted to decipher culpability from police reports and their
own investigations. After meetings with the clients, the defense team drew their conclusions. In
both cases, the reports varied from Jill and Dana’s version of  events. The defense team embraced
Jill’s innocence while Dana’s innocence was, at best, inconclusive. Dana received quality
representation but the defense team was not enthralled.  
When we discussed cases, a greater zeal was given to Jill’s defense. Jill’s case took on a greater
urgency than Dana’s. We had to win Jill’s case. She was innocent. Dana’s case meant a trial with
seasoned and sullied Vice Squad detectives testifying about our worldly client’s sexual
conversation. Dana was more than likely guilty. Why did she insist on having a trial?
As a former public defender, I understood how one felt compelled by the urgency of  representing
innocent clients.11 No defense attorney wants to see an innocent person convicted of  a crime.
Nevertheless, as a public defender, I vowed zealous representation no matter the status of  the
client. Diligence is expected in representing any client.12 Zealous representation is a matter of
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10 Representing teenaged prostitutes can be a complex
task.  Dana was the composite of  both the exploited
child-woman and the worldly teenaged prostitute.
See Magnus Seng, Child Sexual Abuse and
Adolescent Prostitution: A Comparative Analysis, 24
Adolescence 665 (1989).
11 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the
Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the
Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 931, 932-
34 (1983); John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All
Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas but
Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 88, 88-90
(1977); Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-
Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The
Case of  Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88
Cornell L. Rev. 1361, 1382-86 (2003); Josh Bower,
Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1117
(2008); John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction?  The
Uneasy Courtship of  Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50
Emory L.J. 437, 444-52 (2001); Daniel Givelber,
Punishing Protestations of  Innocence: Denying
Responsibility and Its Consequences, 37 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 1363, 1364-71, 1384 (2000); Kenneth Kipnis,
Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea, 86 Ethics
93, 97–100 (1976); Laurie L. Levenson, Police
Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35 Suffolk U.
L. Rev. 1, 42 (2001); David Lynch, The Impropriety of
Plea Agreements: A Tale of  Two Counties, 19 Law &
Soc. Inquiry 115, 132 (1994); Kevin C. McMunigal,
Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40
Hastings L.J. 957, 986-90 (1989); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a
Regulatory System, 17 J. Legal Stud. 43, 52 (1988);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster,
101 Yale L.J. 1979, 1992 (1992); Abbe Smith,
Defending the Innocent, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 485, 494
(2000); Katherine J. Strandburg, Deterrence and the
Conviction of  Innocents, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1321, 1336
(2003); Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining,
39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1121, 1151-55 (1998). 
12 See ABA Ctr. for Prof’l Responsibility, Model
Rules of  Prof’l Conduct R. 1.3 (Diligence in the
Client-Lawyer Relationship). “A lawyer shall act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.” See also Michelle Craven &
Michael Pitman, To the Best of  One’s Ability: A
Guide to Effective Lawyering, 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics
983. Contra Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34
Hofstra L. Rev. 1165 (2006).
personal choice.13 My philosophy in the juvenile clinic was that innocence did not matter but
quality representation did.
I did not want the student attorneys or social workers becoming emotionally or morally invested
in innocent clients. They would extend more time and energy to the Jills of  the world when the
Danas are in true need of  zealous representation. I inquired of  the team why was innocence more
compelling?  I redirected the team to the idea that the more compelling case may be a teenaged
prostitute who is guilty and who may have contemplated sex with strange men in hotels. Such cases
are representative of  girls who come from abusive, dysfunctional backgrounds and needed extra
care. Innocence could not become more important than the need for client-centered
representation. I was in a quandary as to why innocence dominated case round discussions and the
defense team focus. Why had innocence become the lynchpin of  receiving zealous defense? The
rise of  the importance of  innocence in criminal defense has a tragic history.
II. Innocence Paradigm
Circumstances in the State of  Illinois came to underpin the importance of  the innocence
movement. Illinois exonerated more death row inmates than they executed since the death penalty
was reinstituted in 1977.14 Anthony Porter was two days from being executed by the state of
Illinois for a double murder but was eventually exonerated by the Gov. George Ryan.15 Gov. Ryan
Deconstructing Innocence: Reflections from a Public Defender: 
Can student attorneys accept the paradigm of guilt and continue zealous representation?
37
13 I define zealous representation as the ability to give
quality representation to any client no matter what
the charge or whether the client maintains his or her
innocence or is guilty of  the crime(s) charged. See
also Sylvia Steven, Whither Zeal? Defending Zealous
Representation, 65 Or. St. B. Bull. 27 (2005). Stevens
laments the lack of  the requirements of  zealous
representation by the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and the Oregon State Bar
rules. Id. Stevens defines zealous representation as
“doing your best and being dogged in pursuit of  the
client's aims within the bounds of  the law and the
ethical rules. It is compatible with civility and
courtesy and, in my humble opinion, the highest
manifestation of  professionalism.” Id. at 28.
14 In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the imposition of  the
death penalty was arbitrary and inconsistent and
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the U.S. Constitution. A moratorium against the
death penalty remained in effect until the 1977
decision in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976),
that reinstated the use of  the death penalty after
states addressed the problems of  arbitrary and
capricious imposition. 
15 See also David Horan, The Innocence Commission:
An Independent Review Board for Wrongful
Convictions, 20 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 91, 94 (2000).  See
Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Ryan Suspends Death
Penalty, Chi. Trib., Jan. 31, 2000, at 1; Death Penalty
Panel Is No PR Stunt, Chi. Trib., Apr. 8, 1999, at 18
(“The universal recognition—by all three branches
of  state government, plus a legal group—that
there's something wrong with the death penalty
process is a crucial and welcome step toward
needed reform.”); Death ‘System’ Does Not Work,
Cap. Times (Madison, Wis.), Feb. 8, 1999, at 2C
(reporting the call by the Chicago Tribune and the
Chicago Sun-Times and legislators from both parties
for a moratorium on executions in Illinois); Ray
Long, Revamp Likely in Process for Death Penalty, Chi.
Trib., May 18, 1999, at 20 (describing Illinois
lawmakers as “scrambling to agree on how to
revamp the state's death penalty procedures
following several high-profile cases in which
innocent men were released from Death Row”);
Rick Pearson & Gary Washburn, A Change of
Heart on Execution Cases: In the Wake of  Pressure
After Anthony Porter's Release, Both Gov. Ryan and
Mayor Daley Now See Serious Flaws in the Death-
Penalty Process, Chi. Trib., Feb. 11, 1999, at 1 (noting
that “the actions [of  proposing reforms] by two law-
and-order conservative Republicans add up to a
political acknowledgment that the public's
confidence in the death penalty has been shaken”);
Don Thompson, Republicans Back Death Penalty
Study, Chi. Daily Herald, Mar. 24, 1999, at 9 (“Two
law-and-order suburban representatives plan today
to join the push for a moratorium and study of
what's wrong with the way Illinois administers the
death penalty.”). Anthony Porter's case, which
resulted in his release on his own recognizance from
death row on February 5, 1999, and the subsequent
vacating of  his murder convictions on March 11,
1999, Daniel Lehmann, Porter Cleared of  '82
Murders, Chi. Sun-Times, Mar. 12, 1999, at 8, is
both a horror story and a fairly representative 
proceeded to place a moratorium on administration of  the death penalty in Illinois and removed
all inmates from death row.16 Gov. Ryan’s decision gave impetus not only to death penalty
opponents but to the innocence movement. Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld began the first
Innocence Project at Cordozo Law School at Yeshiva University in 1992.17
The Innocence Project represented a different model than traditional clinics. The focus was on the
claim of  innocence and innocence that could be proven through DNA testing.18 The Innocence
Project client generally had exhausted criminal appeals.19 The Innocence Network has assisted in
freeing at least 218 wrongfully convicted persons since its inception, 16 from death row.20
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(15 cont.)   exemplar of  a wrongful conviction,
remarkable only for the success with which the
miscarriage of  justice was ultimately addressed. As
in so many other cases, Porter's innocence was
demonstrated by dedicated individuals outside of
the criminal justice and court systems. See Jim
Allen, Ex-Prisoner Praises Students Who Helped Free
Him, Chi. Daily Herald, Feb. 6, 1999, at 9 (quoting
Northwestern University journalism professor
David Protess saying, “‘[T]he system was forced
from the outside to recognize its injustice.’”).
Porter was convicted of  a 1982 double murder. See
Pam Belluck, Convict Freed After 16 Years on Death
Row, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1999, at A7. His case went
through the state and federal courts' direct appeal
and post-conviction review processes from the time
of  his conviction until March 1998. In September
1998, “two days before Mr. Porter was to be
executed, his lawyers won a stay while a court
considered a motion that Mr. Porter, who has an
I.Q. of  51, was not competent enough to be put to
death.”  Belluck, supra, A7. The extent of  Porter's
mental incapacity was only discovered at that late
date because Porter's trial counsel had neither the
experience nor the funding to investigate his case
properly. Ken Armstrong, Bar Urges Changes in
Capital Cases: Reforms Proposed To Give Defendants
Better Trial Resources, Chi. Trib., Feb. 27, 1999, at 1
(describing Porter's trial attorney's financial
inability “to do much, if  any, pretrial
investigation”). Therefore, “he [did not] establish[]
that his client was mentally retarded – and thus
without the requisite level of  responsibility to merit
the death penalty.” Reforming Illinois' Death Penalty,
Chi. Trib., Mar. 17, 1999, at 22.
“After that, [Northwestern University journalism
professor David] Protess, who each semester assigns
his class murder cases to re-investigate, gave his
students the Porter case.” Belluck, supra, at A7.
These students, assisted by Professor Protess and a
private investigator, thoroughly reinvestigated the
case and discovered major discrepancies in the
accounts of  the murders, a confession by the main
prosecution witness “[saying] he had been
pressured during hours of  questioning by the police
to implicate Mr. Porter,” and finally confessions
from the actual murderer's wife and then the now-
confessed murderer himself, Alstory Simon,
exonerating Porter.  Belluck, supra, at A7.
Although the Illinois authorities never investigated
any other suspect for the murders, see Eric Zorn, A
Few Words Come to Mind for Death Row System, Chi.
Trib., Feb. 9, 1999, at 1, Porter “maintained his
innocence ever since the day of  his arrest,” through
the course of  over sixteen years in prison and a full
array of  capital appeals terminating with the
Supreme Court's denial of  certiorari on federal
habeas corpus in March 1998. John Carpenter &
Alex Rodriguez, ‘I'm Free’: Wrongly Convicted of
Double Murder, Porter off  Death Row, Chi. Sun-
Times, Feb. 6, 1999, at 1; see also Porter v. Gilmore,
118 S. Ct. 1343 (1998) (denying petitions for
rehearing on denial of  certiorari).
Governor George Ryan pardoned Porter of  the
double murder on March 19, 1999, to assist in a
claim for compensation for wrongful imprisonment
from the state. See Governor Pardons Ex-Inmate
Porter, Chi. Trib, Mar. 20, 1999, at 5. Alstory Simon
eventually pleaded guilty to the double murder. See
Tom Ragan, Years After Death Row, Travesty, Killer
Gets Due, Chi Trib., Sept. 8, 1999, at 1. On
September 20, 1999, prosecutors finally dropped
armed robbery charges against Porter, stemming
from the same night as the double murder for which
Porter was convicted to death. See Monica Davey,
Porter at Last Free of  All Charges: Wrongly Sentenced
To Die, He Awaits 2nd Pardon, Chi. Trib., Sept. 21,
1999, at 1.
16 See Governor Ryan Halts the Death Penalty Calls for
Study of  State’s Messed-Up System, Chi. Trib., Feb. 8,
2000; Governor Commutes All Death Sentences, Chi.
Trib., Jan. 11, 2003.
17 See Innocence Project, at http://www.innocence
project .org /about /Miss ion-Statement .php
[hereinafter Innocence Project](last visited Sept. 29,
2008).
18 Id.
19 Id. 
20 The Innocence Project detailed that there are 220
post-conviction exonerations in United States’
history with the average falsely convicted person
serving a twelve-year sentence.  Seventeen falsely
convicted persons received death sentences before
being exonerated. Innocence Project at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/. 
III. Innocence in Clinical Legal Education
In many jurisdictions Clinical education has become invaluable in training law students for the
essentials of  law practice.21 In the United States Clinical education is now an essential component
of  legal education. The Innocence projects have expounded on the clinical education model.
Students have life changing experiences representing men and women exonerated after spending
decades in prison and in some cases on death row. The Innocence Project has wielded great
influence on clinical education.22 In particular, Keith Findley details the skills students develop in
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21 See Legal Education and Professional Development—
An Educational Continuum: Report of  the Task Force
on Law Schools and the Profession:  Narrowing the
Gap, 1992 A.B.A. Sec. Legal Educ. & Admissions
To The Bar. Xi, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/
publications/onlinepubs/maccrate.html#B.%20Ov
erview%20of%20the%20Skills%20and%20Value
s%20Analyzed [hereinafter MacCrate Report]. The
report analyzes the fundamental lawyering skills
essential for competent representation. It begins
with two analytical skills that are conceptual
foundations for virtually all aspects of  legal
practice: problem solving (Skill § 1) and legal
analysis (Skill § 2). It then examines five skills that
are essential throughout a wide range of  kinds of
legal practice:  legal research (Skill § 3), factual
investigation (Skill § 4), communication (Skill § 5),
counseling (Skill § 6), and negotiation (Skill § 7).
The statement next focuses upon the skills required
to employ, or to advise a client about the options of
litigation and alternative dispute resolution (Skill §
8). Although there are many lawyers who do not
engage in litigation or make use of  alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms, even these lawyers
are frequently in a position of  having to consider
litigation or alternative dispute resolution as
possible solutions to a client's problem, or to
counsel a client about these options, or to factor the
options into planning for negotiation. To
accomplish these tasks, a lawyer needs to have at
least a basic familiarity with the aspects of  litigation
and alternative dispute resolution described in Skill
§ 8. Skill § 9 identifies the administrative skills
necessary to organize and manage legal work
effectively. This section reflects the perception that
adequate practice management skills are an essential
precondition for competent representation of
clients.  Finally, Skill § 10 analyzes the skills
involved in recognizing and resolving ethical
dilemmas. Id.
22 See Keith A. Findley, The Pedagogy of  the Innocent:
Reflections on the Role of  Innocence Projects in Clinical
Legal Education, 13 Clinic L. Rev. 231 (2006)
[hereinafter Findley, Pedagogy]; Barry Scheck, Peter
Neufeld & Jim Dwyer, Actual Inncence: Five days to
Execution, and other Dispatches from the Wrongly
Convicted (2000); George H. Ryan, Report of  
the Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment
(Apr. 15, 2002), http://www.idoc.state. 
21 il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/index.html; Innocence
Commission for Virginia, A Vision for Justice (2005),
available at http://www.icva.us/; Gary L. Wells et al.,
Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations
for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 Law & Hum. Behav.
9 (1998); Thomas P. Sullivan, Police Experiences with
Recording Custodial Interrogations, Special Report,
NW. U. Sch. L., Center on Wrongful Convictions
(Summer 2004); Steven A. Drizin & Richard A.
Leo, The Problem of  False Confessions in the Post-
DNA World, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 991 (2004); Richard A.
Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of  False
Confessions: Deprivations of  Liberty and Miscarriages
of  Justice in the Age of  Psychological Interrogation, 88
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 429 (1998); Gail
Johnson, False Confessions and Fundamental Fairness:
The Need for Electronic Recording of  Custodial
Interrogations, 6 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 719 (1997); Steven
A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cameras Roll:
Mandatory Videotaping of  Interrogations Is the
Solution to Illinois' Problem of  False Confessions, 32
Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 337 (2001); Keith A. Findley,
Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice Study
Commission To Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 Cal.
W. L. Rev. 333 (2002); Michael J. Saks et al., Toward
a Model Act for the Prevention and Remedy of
Erroneous Convictions, 35 New Eng. L. Rev. 669
(2001); Sharone Levy, Righting Illinois' Wrongs:
Suggestions for Reform and a Call for Abolition, 34 J.
Marshall L. Rev. 469 (2001); Steven Clark,
Procedural Reforms in Capital Cases Applied to
Perjury, 34 J. Marshall L. Rev. 453 (2001); Michael J.
Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA
“Fingerprinting” Can Teach the Law About the Rest of
Forensic Science, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 361 (1991);
George Castelle, Lab Fraud: Lessons Learned, The
Champion, May 1999 at 12; Scott Bales, Turning the
Microscope Back on Forensic Scientists, 26 Litig. 51
(2000); U.S. Dep’t of  Justice, Office of  Justice
Programs, National Institute of  Justice, A Report
from the National Commission on the Future of
DNA Evidence, Postconviction DNA Testing:
Recommendations for Handling Requests (1999),
http:/www.ojp.usdoj. gov/nij/pubssum/177626.
htm.; Rob Warden, The Snitch System, NW. 
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ocuments/SnitchSystemBooklet.pdf; Daniel
Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful 
representing clients in wrongful conviction cases:
“Innocence projects offer particularly good opportunities for learning about the importance of  facts;
about the importance of  being skeptical, vigilant, and thorough; about ethics, values, and judgment;
and about the criminal justice system itself  – from obtaining a critical perspective on legal doctrine
to a critical understanding of  ‘the law in action,’ that is, how the criminal justice system actually
works, and how it might be made to work more effectively and fairly.”23
The valuable work of  Innocence Projects can be measured by the many reforms instituted in the
criminal justice system after highlighting the plight of  the wrongfully convicted.24 The media has
also become a key player in the portrayal of  the wrongfully convicted person. The American
public can watch in real time as a prison releases a wrongfully convicted man or woman after
decades of  imprisonment.25 The portrayals of  release are emotional and they strike a chord with
the American public. The cases, the narratives and the images of  the innocent leave an effect on
our collective psyche. An unintended consequence however may be the focus on the importance
of  innocence.
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Do With It? A Commentary on Wrongful Convictions
and Rationality, Mich. St L. Rev. 1315 (2003); Daniel
S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal:  Prosecutorial Resistance to
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125 (2004); Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on
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(2006); Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between
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399 (2006); Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability
Back In: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the
Twenty-First Century, Wis. L. Rev. 479 (2006); Mary
Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old
Objections Must Yield to New Realities, Wis. L. Rev.
541 (2006); Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification:
Systemic Reforms, Wis. L. Rev. 615 (2006); Katherine
R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin's
New Governance Experiment, Wis. L. Rev. 645
(2006); Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocence:
Aberration or Systemic Problem?, Wis. L. Rev. 739
(2006).
23 See Findley, Pedagogy, supra note 22, at 241. Findley
quotes Dean Ken Davis in describing “law in
action” as the concept of  the legal educational
philosophy at the University of  Wisconsin Law
School. As Dean Davis has explained, Wisconsin
has a tradition of  focusing its scholarship and
teaching on “law in action,” the concept that “in
order to truly understand the law, you need not
only to know the ‘law on the books,’ but also to
look beyond the statutes and cases and study how
the law plays out in practice.” Dean Davis has
written, “‘Law in Action’ reminds us that no matter
how interesting or elegant the theory or idea, we
always need to ask, ‘Why should this matter to
people in the real world?’” Kenneth B. Davis, Law in
Action: The Dean's View, available at
www.law.wisc.edu/Davislawinactionessay.htm at 1.
24 See Innocence Project, supra note 17, available at
http:/ /www.innocenceproject.org/f ix/False-
Confessions.php. The Innocence Project reports
that the recording of  interrogations reduces the
likelihood of  false confessions. The Supreme
Courts of  Alaska and Minnesota have declared
that, under their state constitutions, defendants are
entitled as a matter of  due process to have their
custodial interrogations recorded. In 2003, Illinois
became the first state to require by law that all
police interrogations of  suspects in homicide cases
must be recorded.  Police departments in Broward
County (Florida) and Santa Clara County
(California), among others, have begun to record
interrogations without a law requiring them.
Proactive policies like these have been adopted
because the practice benefits police and prosecutors
as well as innocent suspects. Id. 
25 See Elliot C. McLauglin, Convicted by Doodles,
Masters Is Freed by DNA, Jan. 25, 2008, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/01/22/masters.ca
se/index.html#cnnSTCText
IV. Deconstructing Innocence
Fundamental Question
Has the emphasis on innocence of  late created a category of  clients that have been deemed more
worthy of  zealous representation? No one deserves greater representation than does the wrongfully
convicted who did not receive it and paid the costs with their freedom. The Illinois Commission
on the death penalty cited inadequate representation as one of  the major problems of  how the
innocent become convicted of  crimes they did not commit.26 The potential problem becomes the
emphasis on the person who was wrongfully convicted and not on the system that allowed an
innocent person to be convicted.  
The narratives of  the wrongfully convicted persons are riveting.27 Spending decades in prison and
potentially having exhausted all appellate remedies, the Innocence Project has been the only hope
for many. The Innocence Project has also been the catalyst for criminal justice reform.28 Critics
however, note that the focus on innocence in the media and government creates an unintended
consequence of  innocence being the exclusive reason for reform or zealous representation.29
Innocence can be a dual-edged sword. The focus on innocence brought needed attention to a
troubled system but it has also been used as a gate keeping function in federal courts.  The focus
on innocence created procedural and substantive problems. The courts and Congress used
innocence as a procedural bar and severely limited access to grant habeas review in the name of
innocence. Innocence has a profoundly negative impact on non-innocence substantive issues such
as justification defenses and constitutional violations. 
The Procedural Problem and The Original Innocence Movement
Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker extrapolate that the first innocence movement began after the
Warren court introduced expansive treatment of  collateral federal review of  state court
convictions as a vehicle for the consideration of  all federal constitutional claims in a federal 
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Armstrong and Steve Mills, The Failure of  the Death
Penalty in Illinois, Part 2:  Inept Defenses Cloud Verdict
(Nov. 15, 1999), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/specials/chi-991115deathillinois2,0,721147.
story.
27 See Jim Dwyer, Peter Neufeld & Barry Scheck,
Actual Innocence: Five days to Execution and Other
Dispatches from the Wrongfully Convicted (2000).
28 The Innocence Project has a series of  priority issues
that would assist in fixing the system including:
eyewitness identification, false confessions, DNA
testing access, evidence preservation, forensic
oversight, innocence commissions and exoneree
compensation. Innocence Project,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/Priority-
Issues.php. The Innocence Project also assisted in
federal legislation, the Justice For All Act of  2004,
Public Law 108-405,108th Congress. The purpose
of  the Act is to protect crime victims' rights, to
eliminate the substantial backlog of  DNA samples
collected from crime scenes and convicted
offenders, to improve and expand the DNA testing
capacity of  federal, state, and local crime
laboratories, to increase research and development
of  new DNA testing technologies, to develop new
training programs regarding the collection and use
of  DNA evidence, to provide post-conviction
testing of  DNA evidence to exonerate the innocent,
to improve the performance of  counsel in state
capital cases, and for other purposes. Available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h
108-5107.
29 See infra notes 30–48. See also Brandon L. Garrett,
Judging Innocence, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 55 (2008);
Daniel Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev.
1549 (2008); Andrew M. Siegel, Moving Down the
Wedge of  Injustice: a Proposal for Third Generation
Wrongful Conviction Scholarship and Advocacy, 42
Amer. Crim. L. Rev. 1219 (2005).
forum.30 Paradoxically, actual innocence became a narrowing avenue for appellate review in
reaction to the Warren Court.  
The Supreme Court guided by Justices Burger and Rehnquist limited the substantive scope of
federal habeas review.31 The Court emphasized innocence as a limiting criterion.32 The Court
precluded re-litigation of  Fourth Amendment claims rationalizing that it would impede claims
rather than promote the accuracy of  criminal verdicts.33 The Court proceeded to preclude “new”
constitutional claims and allowed only narrow exceptions.34 Lastly, the Court relaxed the standard
for finding constitutional errors. The Court allowed findings of  harmless on habeas review,
determining that only truly grievous constitutional wrongs—conviction of  the innocent being the
paramount case—should be corrected on habeas.35
Congress added legislation to the first innocence movement by amending the federal habeas statute
in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of  1996 (AEDPA).36 Congress crafted an
innocence exception that relied exclusively on factual innocence.37 The law required that the
petitioner prove such factual innocence by “clear and convincing evidence” as opposed to the
previous and more lenient “more likely than not” evidentiary standard.38 The use of  factual
innocence as the essential factor for review established two governmental paradigms: 1)
acknowledgement of  innocent persons being convicted and 2) the use of  factual innocence to limit
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incorporation of  the criminal procedure provisions
of  the Bill of  Rights, its expansive reading of  those
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availability of  federal review of  state court
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constitutional adjudication in the criminal process
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Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992) (applying “cause
and prejudice” standard to failure to develop the
facts underlying claim) (overruling Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293 (1963)); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467
(1991) (applying “cause and prejudice” standard to
new claims not presented in previous petition);
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (applying
“cause and prejudice” standard to successive claims
raising grounds identical to grounds heard and
decided on the merits in a previous petition).
32 The authors note that the Court in McCleskey v.
Zant, Murray v. Carrier and Kuhlmann v. Wilson
decisions crafted a narrow “miscarriage of  justice”
exception to the “cause and prejudice”
requirement, allowing petitioners to raise successive
claims, repetitive new claims, or defaulted claims if
they made a colorable showing of  actual innocence
of  the underlying crime. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499
U.S. 467 (1991) (repetitive new claims); Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (defaulted claims);
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (successive
claims); see also Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333
(1992) (crafting an even narrower “innocent of  the
death penalty” miscarriage-of-justice exception).
33 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 30, at 610, citing Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (denied granting relief
based on Fourth Amendment claim litigated at
trial).
34 Id., citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)(barred
relief  based on state rule that was not established
during the state decision).
35 Id., citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619
(1993)(relaxed the constitutional standards for
harmless error from beyond a reasonable doubt to
whether error had substantial and injurious effect).
36 Id. at 611, citing Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C.).
37 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).
38 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 30, at 610, citing
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). The
Court imposed a “clear and convincing” standard
of  proof  only on defendants seeking to show that
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Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 336.
all other claims including those of  a constitutional nature. Steiker and Steiker postulate that
judicial and legislative re-calibration of  federal habeas corpus relief  was part of  a larger movement
to accurate determination of  guilt or innocence which became the only value in constitutional
criminal procedure.39
Congress and the federal courts used innocence to limit access of  defendants to the courts. A study
completed by the U.S. Department of  Justice reiterates Steiker and Steiker’s findings. The
implementation of  the AEDPA reduced the number of  evidentiary hearings granted based on
habeas petitions by half.40 Using innocence as the impetus for change had a chilling effect in capital
habeas cases.41
Substantive Problems with Innocence
The emphasis on factual innocence undermines traditional approaches to criminal defense. The
focus on wrongful convictions creates what Margaret Raymond quantifies as a “supercategory of
innocence”.42 Factual innocence is elevated over other categories of  innocence.43 At trial, the jury
must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to determine guilt.44 The defendant does not
bear the burden of  proving factual innocence or the legally presumed innocence guaranteed by the
constitution.45 The cultural and legal focus on factual innocence may lead juries to conclude that
evidence short of  factual innocence does not justify an acquittal.46
The constitutional rights of  defendants will become secondary to innocence determinations. The
focus on innocence subverts the concern criminal defense litigators have about protecting
defendants’ constitutional rights and launching challenges to illegal search and seizures.47
Constitutional claims of  guilty defendants lack the visceral appeal of  innocence claims.48
V. Conclusion
The innocence movement has proven invaluable in bringing attention to a myriad of  problems in
the criminal justice system. The revelation and poignant freeing of  wrongfully convicted persons
has influenced legislative and court reforms. Criminal defense attorneys and prosecutors are being
held to more stringent standards. The innocence movement has revolutionized clinical legal
education as well. Student attorneys engage in life altering cases and in instances such as Anthony
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47 See Medwed, supra note 29, at 1556,citing Linda J.
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Res. 305, 323 (2001) (presenting results of  empirical
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Porter’s case actually save peoples’ lives. As the students learn to engage in a flawed system they
also need to grasp that some clients are guilty. Quality representation should never be reduced to
essentialist standards of  guilt or innocence. Zealous representation should never be married to the
importance of  innocence. The flaws in the criminal justice system that convict the innocent also
taint the guilty. Jill and Dana represent a cautionary tale of  the attractiveness of  innocence. I
diligently guard against being seduced by innocence. Innocence should never replace the
foundations of  zealous representation. Jill and Dana deserved engaged and zealous student
attorneys no matter their status.  
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